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ABSTRACT
There is increasing interest into how horizontal collaboration between parcel carriers might 
help alleviate problems associated with last-mile logistics in congested urban centres. 
Through a detailed examination of parcel logistics literature pertaining to collaboration, along 
with practical insights from carriers operating in the UK, this paper examines the challenges 
that will be faced in optimising multi-carrier, multi-drop collection and delivery schedules. 
We propose the concept of the ‘Freight Traffic Controller’ (FTC) who would be a trusted 
third-party, assigned to equitably manage the work allocation between collaborating carriers 
and the passage of vehicles over the last mile where joint benefits to the parties were 
achievable. Creating this FTC requires a combinatorial optimisation approach to evaluate the 
many combinations of hub locations, network configuration and vehicle/walking routing 
options in order to find the true value of each potential collaboration, whilst at the same time, 
considering the traffic, social and environmental impacts of these activities. Cooperative 
game theory is a way to investigate the formation of collaborations (or coalitions) and our 
analysis identifies a significant shortfall in current applications of this theory to last-mile 
parcel logistics.  Specifically, we identify that application of theory to urban freight logistics 
has, thus far, failed to account for critical concerns including:  i) the mismatch of vehicle 
parking locations relative to actual delivery addresses; ii) the combination of deliveries with 
collections, the latter often being received in real-time during the round; and iii) the 
variability in travel times and route options due to traffic and road network conditions.
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INTRODUCTION
The parcel distribution sector is a crowded and highly competitive marketplace characterised 
by low profit margins and a proliferation of operators, with carriers typically operating 
independently from each other, leading to poor vehicle utilisation rates and delivery rounds 
that overlap (1). With this duplication of effort, as ‘everyone delivers everywhere’, and the 
need to reduce CO2 in urban centres, driven by EU legislation (2), there is a need to 
fundamentally reinvestigate the efficiency of ‘customer-focused’ last-mile city logistics 
operations. We make three contributions in this paper: firstly, we offer a detailed examination 
of the literature pertaining to collaboration in last-mile parcel logistics; secondly, using our 
survey along with practical insights from two carrier operations in the UK, we identify key 
challenges that will be faced in attempting to best optimise multi-carrier, multi-drop 
collection and delivery schedules whilst maintaining an equitable distribution of work 
between the parties in the collaboration; finally, we highlight the significant gap between 
current theory and practice in this regard and introduce the concept of the Freight Traffic 
Controller as a mechanism for overseeing the management of collaborative relationships in 
this sector. 
BACKGROUND
Freight transport makes up 16% of all road vehicle activity in UK cities, with lorries and vans 
performing 30% of their total movements in urban areas (3). Unlike many other sectors, the 
freight industry has few barriers to new entrants, particularly in the parcels sector, where 
anyone with a van and a standard car-driving licence can operate. Over the last ten years, van 
traffic has increased by almost a fifth and is forecast to grow in the UK’s biggest cities (1, 3). 
This growth has been attributed to: i) new methods of buying goods, particularly online 
shopping, where UK retail parcel deliveries increased by 15.7% in 2015 compared to the 
previous year, with just over one billion parcels delivered (4); ii) just-in-time procurement 
resulting in less-efficient, small-package flows to consumers; iii) increasing demand for 
servicing functions where the service rather than goods transport is the primary purpose of the 
vehicle activity (1). The resulting experience for those who live and work in inner-urban areas 
is a multitude of carriers competing over the last-mile for scarce kerbside space and adding to 
traffic congestion and pollution. 
Characteristics of Multi-Drop Parcel Operations
The UK domestic parcels distribution sector generated almost £9 billion in revenue in 2015 
with business-to-business (B2B) accounting for 54% of this; business-to-consumer (B2C), 
34%, and consumer-to-all-parties (C2X), 12% (5). With B2C and C2X parcel deliveries 
accounting for almost two-thirds of UK parcel volume and expected growth of around 5% per 
annum (6), the shift towards the relative importance of B2C and C2X sub-markets is resulting 
in the need for greater parcel handling capacity, requiring carriers to invest in their delivery 
networks, depot infrastructure, vehicle fleets and supporting technologies. Although there are 
a small number of multi-drop carriers with very large vehicle fleets, there are many smaller 
players, often self-employed, who either directly compete or work for larger operators on a 
casual basis. The level of competition in the parcels sector has resulted in reduced revenue per 
delivery for carriers (7) and the pressure on delivery rates seems likely to continue, as the 
parcel distribution sector becomes increasingly crowded with the entrance of other non-
traditional players such as Amazon and Uber. As a consequence, parcel carriers will need to 
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better control their operational costs while, at the same time, make infrastructural investments 
to remain competitive (8).
Parcel carriers offer a wide range of services which cover immediate, same day, next 
day and ‘standard’ delivery (e.g. 3-14 days), all of which may have guaranteed delivery time 
windows. Services also vary in terms of geographical coverage and scope (e.g. local, regional, 
national, international). Analysis of UK parcel deliveries suggested that 42% of orders 
despatched to consumers in September 2015 were sent ‘economy’ (i.e. with no assured 
delivery lead time, no specific delivery day or time-slot); 30% were despatched for next day 
delivery; 4% were despatched using other services (including same day, next day before 
12:00, next day after 12:00, next day after 17:00, and Saturday or Sunday delivery); while 
24% were despatched internationally (4).
To meet these differing customer demands, multi-drop operations can take several 
different forms. A parcel service based wholly within one city is likely to make use of a single 
depot from which multi-drop vehicle rounds are performed. Meanwhile, national or 
international carriers will typically make use of hub-and-spoke networks (which are likely to 
be multi-modal if distances are significant) in which central hubs and regional/local 
distribution centres are operated, with large, fully-loaded vehicles operating between hubs and 
other distribution centres, and smaller vehicles used to perform multi-drop rounds for last-
mile delivery. Parcel carriers typically operate their last-mile vehicle rounds out of local 
depots with vehicles undertaking deliveries to customers as well as collections, the latter 
being a mixture of pre-planned and sometimes ad hoc requests received during the round. 
Vehicle rounds are typically organised by geographical area (e.g. sub-postcodes) with loads 
grouped according to maximum vehicle capacity (either by volume or by weight) and the 
round order dictated by any premium deliveries that are subject to a specified delivery time 
window. 
Vehicle drivers can have a considerable amount of say in the final round structure with 
some carriers leaving the route order entirely to their discretion as they believe the driver is 
best placed, in terms of their extensive local knowledge and experience, to negotiate the 
intricacies involved. Indeed, anecdotally, round planning software can produce less efficient 
routes than actual routes by failing to adequately capture the operating practices of 
experienced drivers. For this reason, many multi-drop parcel carriers keep the same drivers 
allocated to the same geographical areas not only to acquire the detailed route knowledge but 
to build personal relationships with regular clients. Going against this are the newly emerging 
‘lifestyle couriers’ who are self-employed owner-drivers working on a freelance basis for 
parcel carriers, providing last mile delivery on behalf of a carrier in a designated area and paid 
on a per-delivery basis. The subtleties of individual customer delivery characteristics 
combined with dynamic collection requests during the round, parking, access restrictions and 
traffic congestion means that the optimisation challenge facing schedulers in this domain can 
be considerable.
Current Challenges Facing Multi-Drop Parcel Carriers
The growth in e-commerce and the ability to receive goods within a matter of hours after 
ordering has placed considerable pressures on the logistics industry. The situation has been 
further exacerbated by many retailers offering ‘free’ delivery options to their customers in 
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order to attract custom and requiring carriers to accept later cut-off times for next day delivery 
to gain customer share (9). A study of 239 UK retail websites, in 2014, suggested that 70% 
provided free delivery on minimum order thresholds from as low as £10 (10), forcing carriers 
to adopt low pricing models (11). In addition to these retailer-driven pressures, individual 
customers are demanding ever faster, more reliable and convenient services that have led 
carriers to develop and expand timed delivery window options, parcel traceability throughout 
the supply chain and alternative delivery options, including attended collection points and 
unattended locker banks, all of which have considerable investment implications (12, 13). 
Servicing these options, particularly during retailer driven ‘shopping frenzies’ such as ‘Black 
Friday’ and ‘Cyber Monday’ (9) can lead to inefficient logistics practices with many vehicle 
trips being duplicated across urban centres as carriers attempt to honour service agreements. 
Tied to these events are the underlying issue of carriers having to also manage returned 
products, especially from online B2C and C2X parcel flows, and an average first-time 
delivery failure rate of 13-14% (14) with additional implications for logistics planning and 
delivery efficiency. 
From a city authority’s perspective, this climate is creating added pressure on street 
performance with van traffic in London projected to increase by 20% by 2030 and road 
conditions (e.g. vehicle delays) worsening (15). The climate is therefore right for carriers and 
local authorities to reassess how they can best operate in urban centres to still meet customer 
demands whilst reducing costs. Collaborative working and the concept of the ‘carriers-carrier’ 
is now being actively pursued by some parcel carriers (16) and such enterprises can be of a 
wider benefit, reducing vehicle numbers and related congestion.
COLLABORATIVE WORKING BETWEEN PARCEL CARRIERS – THEORY AND 
PRACTICE
We undertook a critical review of academic literature and industry case study reports relating 
to parcel carrier operations and collaboration in the freight industry, supported by operational 
audits of two major UK-based parcel carriers, including face-to-face interviews and 
ethnographic observation of couriers on delivery rounds to gain a better understanding of 
practical working requirements, issues and constraints.
Approaches to Collaboration
Traditionally, parcels carriers have viewed each other as competitors and have not 
countenanced the concept of collaborating in last-mile operations. Collaboration is possible 
when two or more actors share their efforts to achieve a common objective and in 
transportation it involves a physical exchange of shipments between collaborating partners, 
who share material and immaterial resources in the form of logistics facilities, vehicles, 
information as well as planning and optimisation methods (17). Unlike vertical collaboration, 
which involves partners positioned at different levels of a supply chain (18, 19), horizontal 
collaboration aims to identify and achieve win-win situations (e.g. improved optimisation, 
loaded capacity and asset utilisation (20, 21)) between organisations that may or may not be 
competitors operating at the same level of a supply chain. 
In the ‘carriers-carrier’ model, one carrier hands over parcels to another who may be 
better placed to make the final deliveries due to either the geographic location of their depot 
infrastructure or their fleet characteristics (e.g. using electric vehicles, which may be better 
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suited to the task where preferential access and parking conditions are available for 
environmentally-friendly vehicles.) Such collaborative services exist and are well used by 
major carriers for the Scottish Highlands and Islands, and the Isle of Man, both of which 
comprise depopulated areas with poor road networks as well as the need for sea crossings (22, 
23). Such horizontal collaborative practices lead not only to lower shipping costs and quicker 
delivery service but also allow companies to reduce the environmental impact of their 
distribution activities (24). 
The two main approaches to horizontal logistics collaboration are order sharing and 
capacity sharing (25). The former involves the exchange of customer requests for transport 
services between participants of a cooperative network of carriers, and is achieved through 
one of the following techniques: joint route planning, auction-based mechanisms, bilateral 
lane exchanges, load swapping or shipment dispatching policies. The latter involves sharing 
vehicle capacities, rather than customer requests, and each participating carrier delivers its 
individual order set. A detailed discussion of techniques used by both horizontal logistics 
collaboration approaches can be found in (25), while Table 1 provides some example case 
studies found in the literature. The reported benefits of such partnerships include reductions in 
distance-based costs by up to 16% (24), environmental cost by 24% (24), and volume 
increases of 25% for cooperating partners (26) with the capacity sharing approach to 
horizontal collaboration being the more popular method.
Table 1 here
Sharing the Benefits using Cooperative Game Theory
In order to find an optimal strategy for enabling fair and efficient collaboration between a 
coalition of stakeholders, we must consider some key questions:
i) Who are the collaborating partners? 
ii) What resources does each partner have available to the collaboration (depots, vehicles, 
personnel)?
iii) What is the geographical scope of the collaboration? For example are certain areas to 
be served solely by one of the partners?
iv) What parcel volumes are to be transferred between partners and when/where/how will 
transfers take place? To what extent, will approximate volumes be known in advance, to 
allow effective planning? 
v) To what extent are transfers of parcels mandatory (e.g. due to a contractual agreement) 
or voluntary (e.g. where a freight exchange website service is used)?
vi) What are the allocation rules in the collaborative relationship and how can a fair 
allocation be achieved? For example, shares can be determined by dividing the value of 
the collaboration equally amongst the partners, or proportionally, according to the value 
they bring or the cost they incur within the collaboration, including total cost or distance 
travelled. 
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Cooperative game theory is a way to answer some of these questions around the 
formation of collaborations (or coalitions) and the fair distribution of the benefits.  For parcel 
deliveries, one possibility is that a number of different carriers work together towards a multi-
carrier collaborative operation.  Collaboration might also be a possibility across a carrier’s 
carrier, tasked with performing the last-mile delivery operations. For any potential 
collaboration, cooperative game theory is concerned with two fundamental questions.  The 
first is to find a coalition structure, i.e., clustering the members (or players) into coalitions.  In 
particular, if a carrier i bears a cost v({i}) in performing their delivery operations, and a 
carrier j faces a similar cost v({j}) for their operations, it is expected that a coalition S = {i, j} 
between these two carriers will result in a reduction of the overall cost v(S) such that v(S) ≤ 
v({i}) + v({j}), and similarly with coalitions with more than two members.  The second 
question is to calculate a payoff vector that describes how to divide the value v(S) of a 
coalition S amongst its members.  In doing so, one must ensure that the allocations are fair, 
i.e., the payoffs reflect the contribution of each of the members, and that the coalition is 
stable, meaning that there is no incentive for any of the members to leave the coalition.  The 
collaboration should not leave any carrier worse-off than if they were to operate on their own.  
Fairness and stability are needed for a collaboration to be able to sustain itself.  Below are 
some of the concepts through which these questions, and in particular the calculation of the 
payoff vector, can be addressed (43):
1. For a given coalition C, the Shapley value calculates the payoff of each member of the 
coalition to be proportional to the marginal contribution of that member. If v(S) is the 
value of a subset S of the set N of players, the Shapley value of player i is calculated as:
,
| S |!(| N | − | S | −1)!
| N |!S⊆N \{i}∑ (v(S ∪{i})− v(S))
where v(S ∪ {i}) – v(S) is the marginal contribution of player i.  This concept has been 
applied within freight forwarding operations to allocate the total cost of collaboration 
among multiple carriers (27). It has also been discussed within the context of shipper 
collaboration arising in full truckload logistics (45), but has not been applied to parcel 
logistics due to the inherent complexity of calculating this value. A more recent 
application has been described for collaboration within transportation problems (46), 
although the results provided therein are based on hypothetical instances.
2. The Banzhaf index is a similar measure to the Shapley value, defined individually with 







where the total marginal contributions are averaged across all coalitions of the game.  We 
are not aware of any studies that use this particular mechanism for allocating costs within 
collaborative logistics.
3. The two measures described above do not guarantee that the payoffs generated using 
the marginal contributions will result in a stable coalition.  Assume a collaboration S 
formed between parcel carriers, and that there exists a subset S’ of carriers with a worse 
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payoff than the value v(S’) of the subset, then there is an incentive for members of S’ to 
deviate from coalition S and form a new one.  The concept of core has been introduced to 
find a payoff that is stable and in which there would be no incentive to deviate from.  In 
particular, for any set N of players, any non-negative payoff vector x = (x1, x2, …, x|N|) that 
satisfies x(N) = v(N) and x(C) ≥ v(C) for all subsets C of N is in the core, indicating that 
the core of a game is not a unique concept and that it might also be empty. Theoretical 
work exists on determining the core of routing games (47), as well as applications to 
illustrative examples (46).  An application to a practical problem arising in collaborative 
full truckload logistics is described by Özener and Ergun (45). Other concepts such as the 
nucleolus, the kernel, the bargaining set and the stable set also exist (43).
Cooperative game theory has rarely been applied to the context of multi-drop 
operations between carriers where the combined scale of operations is significant (27, 44).  
One of the main sources of difficulty with finding a fair and stable allocation in a game is the 
calculation of the value of a collaboration, bearing in mind that there may be exponentially 
many coalitions that can be formed among a set N of players and in most instances, one would 
have to solve a combinatorial optimisation problem, such as hub location, network design, 
vehicle routing or a combination thereof, to find the value of each possible coalition.  Existing 
studies that present algorithmic approaches for the problem of cost allocation have so far 
considered settings in which the underlying optimisation problem is simpler than what would 
arise in multi-drop parcel operations. For example, Özener and Ergun (45) describe cost-
allocation mechanisms for an application arising in full truckload logistics, in which shippers 
collaborate to reduce their total transportation cost and increase the utilisation of the truck 
capacity of a carrier.  The underlying optimisation problem is to cover all the deliveries from 
a given origin to a given destination using full truckloads, where the trucks do not visit 
intermediate locations.  In the application described by Krajewska, et al. (27), every coalition 
gives rise to a multi-depot, capacitated pickup and delivery problem with time-windows, 
which is solved using a heuristic algorithm.  Within cargo transportation (e.g. liner shipping 
or air cargo), there is scope for carriers to form alliances as a mechanism for collaboration but 
there is also very little literature available within this area of research (44).  The literature is 
yet to see applications of game theoretic concepts to multi-drop parcel operations that fully 
take into account the characteristics and complexities of the underlying optimisation problems 
in such settings.  We discuss what some of these characteristics would be, first at a strategic 
and tactical level, then operational, in the remainder of this section, with a particular focus on 
urban settings.
Strategic and Tactical Decision-making Challenges
Determining the most efficient collaboration requires effective business models for logistics 
and distribution management, for which decisions concerning the transfer of goods and 
resource utilisation need to be made at different levels.  Strategic and tactical decisions need 
to be taken which generally pertain to (large-scale) distribution system design which may 
include: i) the location of hubs or warehouses; ii) the assignment of customers or districts to 
hubs; and iii) the amounts of flow at an aggregate level between the various points in the 
network, giving way to problems such as hub, depot or facility location (34) or network 
design (35). Particularly relevant to the design of multi-drop freight distribution networks in 
urban areas are the single and two-echelon distribution structures that have been suggested for 
city logistics applications (36, 37). The logic behind these is to prevent large freight vehicles 
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entering busy urban areas by consolidating goods into smaller shipments at the boundaries 
from where deliveries into the city centre can be done using smaller and more 
environmentally-friendly modes of transportation. When a distribution network is already in 
place, that is, the design of the network has been finalised, the next set of decisions at the 
tactical level concern producing a transportation plan that will operate in the medium-term. 
These decisions include: i) fleet composition and size; ii) selection of routes and schedules 
(i.e., ‘timetables’) for the larger vehicles operating between main depots or terminals; iii) 
synchronisation of vehicle operations between different echelons of the network and different 
vehicle types (e.g. transfers from lorries to electric vans); and, when appropriate, iv) the 
utilisation of the depots (36), but these decisions do not normally extend to last-mile delivery 
operations.
PUTTING PRACTICE INTO THEORY - OPERATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Operational decision-making, concerning the day-to-day scheduling and routing of smaller 
vehicles performing last-mile delivery to customers would normally be considered as a 
separate problem to be solved once the above strategic and tactical decisions have been made, 
and this is where the variability in the input data (e.g., demand) as well as various operational 
restrictions would normally be taken into account. While there is a rich and ever-growing 
literature base on vehicle routing and scheduling applications and solution methods (38), and 
a number of commercially-available software packages which use these solutions, there still 
remains a significant gap between theory (and the software packages based on this theory) 
and its practical application to the parcel distribution sector, confirmed through our dialogue 
with UK-based parcel carriers.
One of the main issues, seldom considered in theory or catered for within vehicle 
routing packages, is that parking directly outside the delivery address may not be possible, 
particularly on key arterial roads where parking may not be permitted. There can, therefore, 
be a significant element of walking between the vehicle and the delivery address and during 
one delivery round observed in the City of London, where one of the authors accompanied the 
courier and mapped the path taken, walking comprised a total of 3.4km (2.1 miles) of the total 
distance of 9.6km (6 miles) travelled (a ratio of walking to driving of 35% / 65%.) The carrier 
stated that vehicle routing software had significantly over-estimated driving distance as a 
result of being unable to model ‘final-approach’ walking.  For practical use in dense urban 
environments, a dual-mode (driving and walking) routing model is warranted. Development 
of such a model would be challenging, given the level of detail required to specify and 
combine a walking network alongside the road network and to accurately represent parking 
locations and associated waiting time limits. In practice, this detailed knowledge lies with the 
courier who learns through experience the best locations to leave the vehicle, bearing in mind 
the likelihood of incurring parking fines, and what parts of the round are more suitable for 
walking than driving, considering the network topology (e.g. one-way streets) and access 
restrictions. 
Further complexities of multi-drop parcel operations in dense city environments 
further challenge the capabilities of existing theory and software tools:
i) Delivery rounds in many multi-drop operations are combined with collections. While 
most collections are known in advance and can be planned, some are dynamic in nature 
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with collection requests being received from clients during the round and relayed to the 
driver who then determines if and how they can be incorporated. Such considerations 
require the solution of so-called dynamic or on-line vehicle routing problems (38), which 
assume that only some (or possibly none) of the input data are available at the time of 
planning the vehicle routes, and the rest of the data arrives over time, either regularly or at 
random intervals.  Optimisation, in its traditional sense, does not apply to dynamic vehicle 
routing problems given the nature of the input data.  Solution approaches are often based 
on re-optimisation of the problem, either at regular intervals or whenever new data are 
received, although this might be costly depending on the complexity of the particular 
problem to be optimised.  Other approaches include using simple rules for inserting new 
requests into existing routes and planning the routes in anticipation of future requests, 
using historical data (39, 40).
ii) Constraints related to time, both for customers (e.g. for premium deliveries) and for 
drivers (e.g. maximum driving time restrictions, breaks and shift changes).
iii) Travel times and route options may vary over time due to traffic and road network 
conditions.  If such conditions are known in advance or can be predicted with good 
accuracy, a time-dependent vehicle routing problem can be solved in which the planning 
horizon is discretized into smaller time units, each of which reflects the traffic and road 
conditions (e.g. congestion, travel speed or travel time).  If the data do not vary with time 
but change in a random fashion, then one would have to resort to using stochastic vehicle 
routing algorithms, in which data would be described in the form of a probability 
distribution.  Stochastic vehicle routing problems can be formulated using chance-
constrained linear programs, or two-stage stochastic programming formulations with 
recourse, but they are more challenging to solve compared with their deterministic 
counterparts (41).
iv) Access restrictions in urban areas might mean delivery routes that are longer than 
necessary, and traversed with variable speeds according to the traffic speed and road 
conditions.  Both route length and vehicle speed are factors that affect the fuel 
consumption of a vehicle and emissions.  In this case, the way in which clients are 
grouped into nodes, the order in which nodes are served, and the average speed on each 
segment of the route will need to be optimised so that driving time and fuel consumption 
can be minimised (42).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
There has been increasing academic interest into how horizontal collaboration between multi-
drop parcel carriers might help alleviate the problems associated with last-mile logistics in 
congested urban centres. Cooperative game theory has been proposed as a way to ensure that 
the benefits from such collaborative logistics operations can be fairly distributed amongst the 
parties but the challenges facing businesses operating in this sector mean that these theories 
cannot truly represent operational reality. The fact that many parcel carriers operate legacy 
systems means that sharing and working with data can be problematic without considerable 
investment in data management systems. The often unique methods of operating, where 
collections can be managed dynamically in real-time as part of the delivery round, with 
drivers having autonomy in the last-mile round design, centred around ‘final approach’ 
walking itineraries, makes optimisation difficult.
Allen, Bektas, Cherrett, Friday, McLeod, Piecyk, Piotrowska, Zaltz Austwick 11
Given these issues, one of the main problems experienced in forming collaborative 
relationships between parcel carriers is in the calculation of the value of the collaboration, 
particularly given that many different coalitions could form between a group of carriers. The 
dynamic nature of parcel distribution suggests these coalitions could change depending on the 
daily collection and delivery profiles presented, implying that they could become unstable as 
new opportunities arise between different parties. Such a problem requires a combinatorial 
optimisation approach to evaluate the many combinations of hub locations, network 
configuration and vehicle/walking routing options in order to find the true value of each 
possible coalition. Given that fairness and stability are key for a collaboration to be 
sustainable, there could now be a role for trusted third-parties to oversee and manage the 
collaborating partners in such coalitions, and allocate the work activity amongst them to better 
service their customers in our urban centres.
This concept of ‘Freight Traffic Control’ for an inner-city region would see the 
individual daily activity schedules from different carriers overseen by a trusted third-party 
‘Freight Traffic Controller’ (FTC) who would attempt to equitably manage and optimise the 
work allocation, and the passage of vehicles over the last mile where joint benefits to the 
parties were achievable. Of interest here is to what extent the FTC could also dictate certain 
policies for the wider benefit of the urban area e.g. the use of certain drop zones, 
consolidation centres or targeted retiming of activity. Using a FTC to oversee parcel carrier 
collaboration could have many benefits for the local environment and participating 
organisations but there would be several key issues to overcome in realising it at a practical 
level:
1) The FTC would need to have access to the collection and delivery schedules of the 
individual carriers within the coalition. This would require working with schedules that 
could potentially be in multiple formats as carriers tend to use their own legacy systems. 
Agreeing a common interface around strict data handling, privacy and management rules 
would be essential. 
2) For the management of these individual schedules, it would be ideal if the FTC 
undertook the optimisation task on behalf of the coalition partners and then issued the 
day’s collection and delivery allocation, potentially by zone. This would be a significant 
task involving powerful metaheuristic algorithms operating on a very large scale to 
address:
i) a fleet of heterogeneous vehicles, composed of the individual carriers’ fleets 
operating from multiple depots serving multiple customers, each requiring either a 
delivery or collection or both
ii) a range of different customer service time requests within specified ‘hard’ (no 
deviation), ‘soft’ (delays incur penalties) and ‘loose’ (delays acceptable) time 
windows
iii) a degree of stochasticity in that a proportion of the customers (typically 13-
14%) will not be present at their specified location, and will potentially require 
redeliveries on the same day
iv) the need to transfer parcels between carriers at various cross-dock points (e.g., 
car parks, small depots)
v) the need to account for walking time in the ‘final-approach’ part of the 
delivery where delivery vehicles are left at strategic stopping points and multiple 
deliveries/collections undertaken on-foot from that location.
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3) A protocol for how collection and returns requests arriving in real-time during the 
daily activity can be handled by the coalition using the existing fleets.
4) Rules for how proof-of-delivery and general accountability are to be handled by the 
coalition, where the optimisation task and work allocation is overseen by the FTC for the 
benefit of all.
In this paper we have identified how current applications of theory to this domain do 
not adequately allow for the subtle operational issues exhibited by the players. Based on 
literature and fieldwork, we identify that for theoretic approaches to be credible in real-world 
last-mile logistics settings, they must take into consideration: i) vehicle parking locations 
relative to actual delivery addresses; ii) the combination of collections with deliveries in real-
time; and iii) the variability in travel times and route options due to road conditions.  This is 
an area that warrants further research to realise the significant potential benefits to urban 
centres of collaborative last-mile logistics.
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TABLE 1: Examples of Horizontal Collaboration Practices of Freight Transport 
Operators
Reference Collaboration form and 
case study type (real or 
simulated)











sharing network where two 
out of five transportation 




consolidate freight for the 
same destination, sharing 
their satellite depots and 
fleets.
Collaboration has some advantages 
but is not always the best solution 
for each criteria. 
Preferred solution for one operator 
does not necessarily coincide with 






Collaborative network of 16 
independent transport and 
distribution companies with 
a central cross-docking hub 
(real).
Distri-XL case study:
Collaborative network of 
five carriers (real).
TransMission case study:
Capacity sharing: At night, 
all deliveries are cross-
docked between partners in 
the central hub and carried 
back to their own regions 
for final delivery.
Distri-XL case study:
Order sharing: Direct 
exchange of freight.
TransMission case study:
More sustainable and efficient urban 
freight transport operations.
Long distance transport (to and from 
hub) is completed off-peak (at 
night).
Distri-XL case study:
Reduction in km of 11%







Collaboration between three 
profit centres of a freight 
forwarding company 
(simulated but based on real 
data).
Collaboration between two 
carriers (simulated).
Order sharing:
Requests are exchanged 
between partners and a 
unique multi-depot pickup 
and delivery request with 
time windows (PDPTW) is 
optimised.
Simulated but based on real data 
scenario:
One collaboration partner achieves 
almost 20% of cost savings and the 
other two partners save around 10% 
each.
Simulated scenario:
10% reduction in the number of 









network consisting of 50 
express carriers (simulated 
but based on real data).
Order sharing:
Requests are exchanged 
between partners with 
collaborative planning using 
cost-based compensation 
schema.
Application of the cost-based 
compensation schema allows the 
cooperative logistics network to 
achieve nearly all cost saving 
potentials and reach the cost level of 
centralized planning, while profit is 
distributed more fairly among all 
network partners.





Courier, Express and Parcel 
(CEP) services provided by 
Cooperative Delivery 
Company (CDC) on behalf 
of four CEP carriers 




Company (CDC) combines 
and performs deliveries for 
participating carriers.
Cost savings in travel time, vehicles 
operating, traffic accident and 
environmental pollution.
Buijs and Case 1: Case 1: Case 1:






Collaboration between two 
autonomously managed 




network involving about 150 
autonomous carriers, called 
“member depots” (real).
Capacity sharing: 
Shipments are cross-docked 




Collected shipments can be 
sent through the 
collaborative network 
(transported to the hub for 
delivery by another depot) 
or fulfilled by other means. 
Concentration of collection and 










transportation firms based 
on backhauling (simulated).
Capacity sharing:
Trucks and routes are shared 
by collaborating partners.
Reduction of distance-based and 
environmental costs by about 16% 
and 24% respectively.















A set of collaborative routes 
are identified for a carrier to 
minimize the total cost to 
service its demand needs.
Reduction of the effects of delays by 
decreasing the amount of idle time at 
terminals.
Potential reduction of deadheading 
and achievement of returns on 
excess capacity.






planning for a joint network 
of two autonomous business 
units of a logistics service 
provider (simulated but 
based on real data).
Capacity and Order 
sharing:
The joint network of two 
depots exchanging 
shipments. The best route 
for shipments to go through 
the joint network is 
determined -directly, via one 
or both depots.
Improved transport efficiency in 






Carrier collaboration for last 
mile delivery consolidation 
(simulated but based on real 
data).
Order sharing:
Shareable orders identified 
by collaborating carriers can 
be consolidated with the 
other carriers’ shipments
- Reduction of the number of inter-
zone journeys. 
- Cost savings to the participants as 
a result of lower fuel consumption 
and fewer man-hours.
